Claire Corbett and Frances Simon
Centre for Criminal Justice Research
Department of Law
Brunel University
February 1999
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. INTRODUCTION
This study set out to examine the effects and effectiveness of various
strategies related to the deployment of speed cameras, and to explore how
different types of driver responded to cameras and perceived their operation.
Recommendations for best deployment were to be considered. It was carried out
between 1993 and 1996 after the Road Traffic Act 1991 authorised the use of
automatic speed devices for the detection of offences. A series of 12 surveys
arranged in five sets and having some cross-sectional and some longitudinal
elements was undertaken together with some depth interviews, and self-report
measures predominated. Five police forces helped to set up the research. In
total 6879 drivers took part. The particular interventions focused upon
comprised camera signing alone; two kinds of publicity campaign linked with
speed camera deployment; prosecution following detection by speed camera; and
the effects of cameras when first installed and over time.
2. PROFILES OF THE FOUR DRIVER TYPES
Earlier research by one of the authors had indicated that drivers' initial
reactions to the installation of cameras (Corbett 1995) had largely been one of
four types. Drivers reported either that they had normally complied with speed
limits on the survey road and so cameras would make no difference to them (these
we termed 'conformers'); or that they had reduced their speed on the survey road
to avoid detection (the 'deterred'); or that they slowed down on approach to
cameras and accelerated away downstream ('manipulators'); or that they carried
on as before driving well above the speed limit ('defiers'). As the ideal aim of
speed cameras is to enlarge the proportion of deterred drivers, to maintain the
number of those who have 'always complied' and to reduce the ranks of the
defiers and manipulators, this study aimed to find out more about the two latter
types of driver. To give an overall picture based on larger numbers, four
samples, totalling 3440 cases, were added together. The general picture conjured
up of manipulators was that they were the most calculating and sophisticated in
their reactions to cameras. They approved of them less than other types but were
familiar with them, they thought they knew where they were, how they operated
and how to drive past them without getting caught. In our surveys they tended to
be the youngest and had the second highest offending and speeding scores and the
highest accident rate. Defiers were like manipulators in being most likely to
drive company or high performance cars and they were most likely to deny a
general link between speed and accident risk. Not unexpectedly they had the
highest speeding and offending scores, and reported the highest speeds on the
survey road after cameras or signs were installed. Such speed preferences could
arise from defiers being the type most likely to discount the risk of detection
(if driving above 45 mph on the survey road), least likely to think the police
would take action against them if they were photographed, and most likely to
expect leniency if police action followed. Conformers on the other hand
presented a picture of generally law-abiding, cautious drivers who approved of
cameras. They were the oldest and most experienced with the lowest speeding and
offending scores and were least likely to have had an accident in the previous
three years. The deterred tended to fall between conformers on the one hand and
manipulators and defiers on the other, but on many variables they were much like
conformers implying that it was the cameras that had made them so.
Despite its apparent crudeness, our four-class typology
was found to distinguish ably between the types of drivers we had earlier
identified on background characteristics, general driving style and perceptions
of cameras. Moreover, results between surveys were consistent and stable, and
the bulk of conformers and deterred on the survey road behaved similarly on
other roads. More lability was indicated in the case of manipulators and defiers,
suggesting that on less familiar roads a minority behaved as deterred, which
raises questions about these defiers' true nature as people who apparently are
uncaring about the threat of detection. Yet the impression from all our data was
that everyone has a price and provided the threat of cameras remains a potent
one, the proportion who ignore them will reduce sooner rather than later.
3. EFFECTIVENESS OF EACH DEPLOYMENT STRATEGY
a) Camera signing alone
Three surveys were conducted in Eastleigh, Hampshire, the first before signs
were erected, the second two months after and the third six months after.
Overall it appeared there was a substantial reduction in speed and most of it
lasted six months. At that point, of those respondents with scope to slow down
over half were going more slowly, and 90% of those who before the signs had been
keeping to the limits were still doing so. Although there were other enforcement
signs and red light camera housings in a nearby city (Southampton), it seems
that speed camera warning signs represented a real objective threat (correlating
with the high subjective threat noted). So while the results must be considered
in context, they were overall encouraging.
b) Two local publicity campaigns relating to the deployment of speed cameras
A longitudinal 'before' and 'after' design was used for both pairs of surveys in
Northumbria and West Midlands, the second one taking place one to two months
after each campaign had been mounted. The campaign in Northumbria aimed to
enhance the perceived efficacy of existing fixed-site cameras by announcing that
they would be supplemented by mobile ones, so undermining drivers' reliance on
knowing where cameras were sited. That in West Midlands intended to suggest that
the prosecution threshold (trigger) speed of existing speed cameras had been
lowered, increasing the risk of detection. Together, the results suggested that
local publicity campaigns may help reinforce perceptions of the potency of
cameras and perhaps of the dangers of speed, even if at less than a conscious
level for many, although among those at greater risk of losing their licence
awareness may have been more conscious.
c) Payment of a fixed penalty after detection by speed camera
One survey was carried out of a sample of drivers detected on a road in the
Thames Valley police force area, all of whom had paid a fine. At face value,
many of the results indicated that the impact of prosecution was in the desired
direction. So, for instance, while 26% said that before prosecution they
normally kept below 31 mph on the survey road, this proportion rose to 87%
afterwards. However, the inadvertent speeding of the majority, some of which was
apparently due to believing the speed limit was higher, meant that for an
unknown proportion (but less than 54%) the deterrent effects of prosecution may
have been more apparent than real. Some information was also gathered from four
other samples on the impact on their driving style of having penalty points.
Together the results suggested that penalty points may have a restraining
influence on a substantial proportion of drivers' speeds. d) Effects of speed
cameras when first installed and over time A series of four surveys was
specifically set up for the purpose of assessing initial reactions to cameras
and drivers behavioural and perceptual responses over time. These were carried
out in Surrey in hitherto 'virgin' territory, and data from two other surveys
also supplemented the findings. The first Surrey survey was conducted before
cameras were installed; the rest took place at two, six and eight months after
commencing operation. The impact of the camera was greatest when first
installed, with speed choice markedly reducing and the perceived risk of
detection substantially increasing. These effects were largely maintained at
least until the eight months point, although other perceptions and beliefs
remained more or less static between the first and last Surrey surveys. It would
be unrealistic to attribute all the encouraging results in the Surrey surveys to
the operation of just one camera and it is likely that other peripheral factors
were influential. Eight surveys addressed the issue of whether camera-induced
speed behaviour generalises to other roads which have no indications of cameras.
This is of importance because the use of speed cameras is restricted, being
considered only when other potential solutions to speed-accident problems have
been rejected. Altogether the results from the self-report data lent strong
support to the notion that the deterrent effects of cameras spread to unsigned
roads.
4. COMPARISON OF THE DEPLOYMENT STRATEGIES USED
In sum, a main finding from our research was that, according to self-report
measures, camera deployment can reduce drivers speeds markedly. Our results
suggest that any of the measures investigated can be useful in helping to lower
drivers' speeds, and most of the effects of installing cameras or signs lasted
for several months. Moreover, some speed reduction was reported among all types
of driver, not just the deterred, in regard to all deployment strategies.
Overall, and for all types of driver except defiers, prosecution appeared to
have the strongest deterrent effect, but results are site specific. The
installation of cameras also had a pronounced effect, with a majority in our
samples describing themselves as deterred after the erection of warning signs
and cameras. Camera warning signs alone were moderately productive, and the
effects were still largely present some months later. Local publicity campaigns
seemingly influenced fewer than half of the speeders, especially manipulators,
to slow down but as part of the effort to raise driver awareness of the risks of
speeding they probably have merit. Defiers were the most intractable group, the
majority remaining uninfluenced by any of the measures.
5. PERCEPTIONS, BELIEFS AND ATTITUDES TO CAMERAS Estimates of threshold speed
above which cameras are activated varied little between survey sites (which all
had 30 mph limits) or across time, the modal estimate being 35 mph and the next
most frequent being 40 mph. In ten surveys the big majority thought the risk of
detection for doing more than 45 mph on the survey road over the next three
months was high. In the five surveys which questioned drivers a second time up
to a third of respondents believed the risk of being caught for exceeding a
speed limit on other main roads in the county had increased since they were
first surveyed. The big majority of respondents believed that some police action
would follow if they were detected by camera, and this perception varied little
over time though it did vary somewhat by area. Around three quarters expected
that the most likely penalty for doing 45 mph on the survey road would be a
fixed one (a speeding ticket). Altogether it appeared that respondents
collectively had a realistic idea of the likely consequences of detection for
speeding. Most drivers in each survey were favourable to cameras, although those
who had been caught approved less. Where measured, the proportions holding
positive attitudes increased over time. Among those not previously caught by
speed camera the bulk of manipulators and defiers also expressed views in favour
of cameras, which is interesting since their behaviour in response to cameras
would suggest otherwise. While overall the results on perceptions, beliefs and
attitudes towards cameras were promising, there may nonetheless be an element of
'preaching to the converted'. The drivers most in favour of cameras, and most
fearful and respectful of them, were those who are probably least likely to fall
foul of them, i.e. conformers. At the other extreme, those who present the main
problem to road safety planners - defiers and manipulators - seem the least
respectful and fearful of cameras and least attitudinally influenced by them.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS
The conclusions of our research lead us to recommend that:
a) local publicity campaigns concerning the operation and existence of speed
cameras continue to be mounted even if direct local benefits are not readily
apparent. It appears that local campaigns can help keep the risks of speeding
and the existence of cameras on the public agenda, and in cumulation with each
and in combination with national efforts they may produce speed reductions.
b) a way be found to remind all drivers of current speed limit conventions and
signing rules and to check more frequently their speedometers to help prevent
inadvertent speeding. Some of those caught speeding unintentionally exceeded the
limit through lack of attention and some through believing they were complying
at the time of detection but were mistaken about the speed limit.
(c) a sustained and uniform policy of reducing camera threshold speeds is
proceeded with as originally envisaged. In addition, it is suggested that future
local publicity campaigns might usefully focus on advising drivers directly of
reduced prosecution threshold ( trigger ) speeds in the area. Prosecution seemed
especially salutary among intentional speeders, and most of those caught held
positive attitudes to cameras (although only a minority of manipulators who had
been caught were supportive). Based on our findings, reducing threshold speeds
as originally planned is likely to lead to more speed reductions and only some
slight loss of approval. Moreover, such a policy should help change perceptions
among some that driving up to 10 mph above the speed limit is complying with the
law.
(d) current resourcing arrangements be reviewed. In order to bolster the
subjective risk of detection and increase the deterrent capability of speed
cameras the objective risk must be maintained and preferably enhanced.
(e) insurance policies against disqualification for speeding be proscribed. Some
drivers, especially defiers, may be tempted to ignore cameras safe in the
knowledge that satisfactory alternative arrangements will be made for them in
the event of their disqualification for speeding.
(f) a policy of reducing the visibility of roadside camera installations be
introduced, and linking with (b) above, a policy of combined speed limit and
camera warning signs in the target area is recommended. Undermining drivers
confidence in knowing the location of fixed-site cameras may reduce manipulating
and encourage more uniform lower speeds, as indicated by manipulators and
defiers reports of driving on other (perhaps less familiar) signed roads. Signs
are considerably cheaper than camera installations, and provided there is some
genuine objective risk of detection our study suggests that subjective risk will
follow.
(g) mobile cameras should have a continuing place in enforcing speed limits even
if resource constraints mean that police do not actually use as many of them as
their publicity campaigns might suggest. While mobile cameras may raise
uncertainty as to the risk of detection provided drivers are aware of their
existence, unless they are used in unattended mode their operation rather
defeats a key purpose of cameras to free-up police time and they are costly in
terms of limited police resources.
(h) wide use be made of powers to impose graduated fines based on declared net
weekly income on speeding drivers who come before the courts (in accordance with
revised guidelines for Magistrates Courts (Magistrates Association 1997)). While
most drivers expected a fixed penalty if caught, our earlier and present
research suggests that at current levels these are unlikely to deter the fastest
ones unless they already have six or more penalty points. However, more points
combined with heavier fines may have more effect.
(i) camera installation be restricted to sites which have previously experienced
a speed-related accident problem or where the potential for accidents is higher
than average, such as at roadworks. This is to prevent speculation that cameras
are a good money-earner for police or the state and to raise the likelihood that
cameras will cut accidents at a particular site.
(j) future media campaigns should point out that most drivers think they are
better and safer than others which is illogical, and that the message of the
danger of speed is directed at all drivers and does not exclude those who
believe they are better. Some paradoxical findings highlighted the challenge
ahead, such as manipulators and defiers holding mainly positive attitudes to
cameras but attempting to subvert their purpose nonetheless.
7. WIDER IMPLICATIONS
Implicit throughout the report and underpinning much of our earlier research is
that the ethos of speed not only permeates discourse on driving, but has
infiltrated all aspects of modern life. So tackling the problem of speed on our
roads runs counter to the general trend in society where speed is desired,
valued and attractive. In this broader picture, attempts to modify drivers'
speed by means of enforcement is unlikely ever to be enough (unless top speeds
are restricted by technology), and a fundamental attitude change to speed on the
roads is required. Individual inclinations to speed at a particular time and
place are motivated by a range of factors, but the most important in our view is
that drivers do not see occasions when they exceed limits as dangerous otherwise
they would not do it. When they speed they feel they are in control and that
little harm will befall them, and these perceptions are strengthened by the fact
that negative reinforcement occurs only rarely. But this perception of control
is to some extent illusory since, for instance, most drivers think they are more
skilful than the average (e.g. Svenson 1981), most believe accidents are more
likely to happen to them as passengers than as drivers (Horswill and McKenna
1997), and most think the roads would be safer if everyone drove like themselves
(Corbett and Simon 1992). In addition, individual instances of speeding are
carried out against a social backcloth in which several factors interlink. Most
drivers speed, so it is a consensual activity and a social norm legitimated by
other speeders, and in combination with the feeling of being in control leads to
few drivers perceiving speeding as serious, harmful, criminal or immoral
(Corbett and Simon 1992). Since there are difficulties in achieving widespread
enforcement, the message picked up by drivers from this could be that some
speeding is condoned, especially given the latitude in camera thresholds. And
when drivers are detected, unless disqualification is imposed outright or under
the 'totting' rules, fixed penalties are not perceived as particularly onerous
(Corbett, Simon and O'Connell 1998). This is all set against a backdrop where
motor vehicle manufacture is encouraged and is indeed a measure of the country's
economic health, and where the demand for production of high performance
vehicles is not discouraged by the state. So although we conclude that the
proliferation of speed cameras is an important means by which to raise drivers'
awareness of the dangers of speed and of inadvertent speeding, ultimately more
than this and other forms of speed limit enforcement will be required in order
to modify drivers' views on speed. Attention will need to be given to factors
associated with overconfidence in being in control and with the broader social
climate in which our car culture is embedded.
REFERENCES
Corbett C and Simon F (1992). Unlawful Driving Behaviour: A Criminological
Perspective. Contractor Report 310. TRL: Crowthorne.
Corbett C (1995). Road traffic offending and the introduction of speed cameras
in England: the first self-report survey. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 27,
345-354.
Corbett C, Simon F and O'Connell M (1998). The Deterrence of High Speed Driving:
A Criminological Perspective. Contractor Report 296, TRL: Crowthorne.
Horswill M and McKenna F (1997). The effect of perceived control on risk-taking.
Journal of Applied Social Psychology (in press).
Svenson O (1981). Are we all less risky and more skilful than our fellow
drivers? Acta Psychologica, 47, 143-148.
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